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[GO C.~,l .t:J1; ~·1 Cal.Rl'tr. 8G9. 386 P.Zd 4931 
[L. A. No. 27-.185. In Bank. Nov. 12, 1963.] 
DEBRA ANN TEALL, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appel-
lant, v. 'fHE CITY OF CUDAHY, Defendant and Re-
spondent. 
[la,lb] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Actions-Plead-
ings.-In an action against a municipality for injurics sus-
tained by a 7 -yrar-old child who was struck by a truck while 
crossing a street, a complaint alleging that due to the ar-
r:lUgement of the traffic signals at thc intersection the only 
signal vi~ible to the child indicated to her that vehicular traf-
fic in the street she wished to cross would yield the right of 
way, whereas all signals were in fact red during each cycle 
to permit vehicles that had entl'red the intersection on It 
green light to clear it before pedestrians brgan to cross, was 
sufficient to state a cause of action against the municipality 
under former Gov. Code, § 53051 (now § 835), imposing li-
ability for injuries to persons and property resulting from 
the dangerous or defective condition of public property. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Torts-Liability for Dangerous or 
Defective Condition of Property.-Public property is in a 
dangerous or defective condition within the meaning of for-
mer Gov. Code, § 53051 (now § 835), when it involves an un-
reasonable risk of injury to the public. 
[3] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Traffic Signals.-
Where It municipality llndertakes to control traffic at an in-
tersection by installing traffic signals, it invites reliance on 
the signals and it may be held liable if it creates a dangerous 
or defective condition in making such installation. 
[4] Municipal Corporations-Torts-Liability for Dangerous or 
Defective Condition of Property.-Former Gov. Code, § 53051 
(now § 83;"», imposing liability for injuries to persons and 
property resulting from the dangerous or defective condition 
of public property, did not eXCl'pt dangerous or defectivo 
conditions resulting from the exercise of governmental dis-
cretion. (Disapproying lJIercado v. City of Pasadena, 176 Cal. 
App.2d 28, 32-33 [1 Cal.Rptr. 134] to the extent that it in-
dicates otherwise.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Leon T. David, Judge. Reversed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d., Highways and Streets, § 234; Am.Jur., 
Highways (1st ed § 5G4). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Streets § 85; [2] M:uncipal Cor-
porations, § 438(5); [3] Streets, § 70; [4] Municipal Corpora-




432 TEALL V. CITY OF CUDAHY [60 C.2d 
Action for prrsollal injurirs sustailled by a child when she 
was struek by a truck while cl'ossillg a street within a marked 
crosswalk after starting from a point where the visibility of 
thc guiding traffic signal was allt·gculy obscured. Judgment 
of dismissal after demurrer to second amended complaint was 
sustail1l'U, reverseu. 
Abraham Marcus and Stanley O. Epstein for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Betts & Loomis, Albert H. Ebright and Brrllard A. Leckie 
for Defenuant and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dis-
missal entered aftt'r the sustaining of drfl'ndant's general 
demurrer to her second amended complaint, which alleged 
that defl'ndant was liable for personal injuries under section 
53051 of the Governmcnt Code.1 
Section 53051 was repealed effective September 20, 1963 
(Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 18). At the same time extensive new 
legislation became effective governing claims and actions 
against public entities and public employers. (Gov. Code, 
810-895.8; Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 1.) This legislation pro-
vides tl1at it "applies retroactively to the full extent that it 
constitutionally can be so applied." (Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 
45, subd. (a).) Examination of thc statutory changes, how-
ever does not disclose any material changes in the law appli-
cable to the facts alleged.!! 
1" A local agency is liable for injuries to persons and property result-
ing from thc dangerous or defecth·e comlition of public property if the 
legislative body, board, or person authorized to remcdy the condition: 
"(a) Had knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerolls condi-
tion. 
"(b) For a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge or receiving 
notice, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably 
necessary to protect the public against the condition." 
:!G o'·crnment Code, section 83,> provides: "Exccpt as provided by 
statute. a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous 
condition of its property if the plaintiff estahli~hes that the property 
was in a dangerous con,iition at the time of thc injury, that the injury 
was proximately caused by the daugerous conuition, that the dangerous 
('ondition createtl a reasonably foreseeable ri~k of the kind of injury 
whieh was incurred, and that cith('r: 
"(a) A ncgligent or wrongful aet or omission of an employee of the 
(lllhJj,· l'nti'ty within the sropc of his employment created the dangerous 
condition; or 
"\I.J) The puhlic entity had actual or cOll.trllctive lIotice of the 
dangerous condition under 8ection 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the 
) 
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The amended complaint alleges that plaintiff, a 7 -year-
old ~hild, was severely injured " .. hile crossing a street in 
the City of Cudahy. We have drawn a diagram an as aid to 
an understanding of the facts alleged. 
Traffic lights controlled the movemcnt 
of pedestrians and vehicles at the inter-
section. The light at C was designed to 
guide pedestrians crossing in the cross-
walk from A to B. Pedestrians stand-
ing at A, however, could not see this 
light, but could see a light located on the 
east side of the street designed to con-
trol vehicular traffic from the north. 
The exact location of this signal is not 
alleged. It appears, however, from a 
map attached to plaintiff's brief, the 
accuracy of which is not challenged, that 
the signal was located atD. Because the 
distance between the north and south 
entrances of Cecilia Street was approxi-
mately one hundred yards, all signals 








C. I D. 
.sa - I Cecilia ~ 
<II 
vehicles that had entered the intersection on a green light to 
clear it before pedestrians began to cross. 
Immediately before the accident, the signal at D was red to 
the north. Unable to see any other signal, plaintiff assumed 
that the light at C was green and proceeded from A into the 
street, where she was struck by a truck coming from the 
south that had not cleared the intersection. . 
[1a] The only issue before us is whether the court erred 
in ruling as a matter of law that the alleged arrangement of 
the lights at the intersection did not constitute a dangerolls 
or defective condition of public property. The other elements 
of liability under section 53051 were properly alleged. 
[2] Public property is in a dangerous or defective condi-
tion when it "involves an unreasonable risk of injury to the 
injury to bave tllken measures to protect against tbe dangerous condi-
tion." 
Governmellt Corle, section 830, suhdh'ision (a), provides; II • Danger-
ous condition' means 8 condition of property that creates a substantial 
(as distinguished from II minor, trh-ial or insignificant) risk of injury 
wben such property or a'l.iI1~('nt property is used with due care in a 
manner in which it is reasonaUly foreseeable that it will be used." 
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public." (Hau,J, v. City uf XCUlport Brach, 46 Ca1.2d 213, 
217 [::!03 P.~d 481.) [lb] l't.'d,'stl'i'lllS have a right to rely 
on traffic signals. The ollly s:gual visible to plaintiff indicated 
to her that north and south n,l;ienlar traffic would yit'ld the 
right of way. Such a condition involves an unreasonable risk 
of injury to the puhlie. It is not lIlaterially different from one 
in which, because of a mechanical defect, all lights at a~\ 
interscction are green simultaneously. (See Bady V. Det : !'ill 1', 
127 Ca1.App.2d 321, 338-339 [273 P.2d 941].) The allegations 
of the complaint are therefore sufficient to state a cause of 
action. 
Defendant contends that only an additional signal would 
have remedied the condition complained of and that under 
Perry V. City of Santa Monica, 130 Cal.App.2d 370, 372-375 
[270 P.2d 92], it had no duty to install one. (See also Gov. 
Code, §§ 830.4, 830.8.) [3] In the present case, howcY<'r, 
defendant undertook to control traffic at the intersection and 
invited reliance on the signals. It may be held liable if it 
rreated a dangero\1s or defective condition ill doing' so. 
(Dudulit V. City of San J!atco, 167 Cal.App.2d 593, 5%-507 
[334 P.2d 9GB] ; Irvin V. Padclford, 127 Cal.App.2d 135, 142-
143 [273 P.2d 5aO] ; see 3 Davis, Administrative Law Trea-
tise (1058) § 23.14, p. 494.) 
[4] Im'okiug' Mercado V. City of Pasadena, 176 Cal.App. 
2d 28, 32-33 [1 Cal.Rptr. 134], defendant contends that 
liabilit~- undt'r section 53051 cannot be predicated on the loca-
tinn of traffic signals because their location involves the C'XP1'-
rise of legislative discrction. Section 53051, however, did not 
('xcept <1ang-crons or defective conditions rC'sulting from the 
cxC'rcise of governmental discretion, and to the extent that it 
inc1icatC's otherwise, the Mcrcado case is disapproved. T J111S, 
in George v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Ca1.2d 303 [79 P.2d 
7~:3], it was contended that if the city were liablc for "tIle 
result of a plan of construction" the jury would have "the 
right to pass upon the discretion of the municipal authol'itif's 
to adopt a system or general plan of improvement of its 
streets." "\Y C' pointed out that under section 58051 "th~ 
municipality is liable for injuries resulting from the danger-
ous or defectiye condition of its public street, whetlle1' S\1t'h 
condition arises from the construction of said street in the 
first instance, or is due to a defcct crcated then'in aftl'r i(..; 
construction." (11 Ca1.2d at pp. 307, 308-309.) 
It is true that the rule of tIle Gcorge easc has been modifi,~d 
) 
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by section 830.6 of the GOYernment Code,3 which provides 
new standards and proced nres for determiuillg w!leth!'r a 
properly approved plan or design has resulted in a dangerous 
condition. It docs 110t appear from the facts alleged in the 
complaint, however, whether or not the new defense provided 
by section 830.6 is available to defendant. Until defendant 
raises that defense by appropriate pleadings, it would be 
premature to COIlS ide l' whethl'r it may constitntioually apply 
to a cause of action that accrued before section 830.6 was 
enacted. (Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, IIIC., 32 Cal.2d 53, 
65 [195 P.2d 1] ; Estate of Johnson, 139 Cal. 532, 534 [73 P. 
424, 96 Am.St.Rep. 161] ; MacLeod v. City of Los Altos, 182 
Cal.App.2d 364, 366 [6 Cal.Rptr. 326].) 
ThE' judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, 0. J., Schauer, J., MeComb, J., Peters, J., Tobri-
ner, J., and Peek, J., coneurred. 
RE'spondellt's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
11, 1963. 
I"Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this 
chapter for an injury caused by the plan or design of a construction of, 
or an improvement to, public property where such plan or design has 
been approved in advance of the construction or improYemcnt hy the 
legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or employee 
exercising discretionary authority to give such apprm'al or where snch 
plan or design is prepared in conformity with standards previously 80 
approved, if the trial or appellate court determines that there is any 
substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable puulic 
employee could have adopted the plan or design or the stan<lrlTlls then', 
for or (b) a reasonable legislative body or other body or elllployet> 
could have approved the plan or design or the standards therefor. ,. 
